【主題】 Fiscal Slack, Rule Constraints, and Government Corruption
財政盈余，制度約束，與政府腐敗——基于工具變量的因果關系證據(jù)
【時間】 2020年12月3日（周四）14:00-17:00
【主講人】 魏文池 中國人民大學公共管理學院助理教授，中國人民大學“杰出學者”青年學者
【主持人】 趙靜 清華大學公共管理學院副教授，CIDEG主任助理
【會議形式】 現(xiàn)場會議及線上直播（騰訊會議號：335455169）
【主辦】 清華大學產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展與環(huán)境治理研究中心（CIDEG）
魏文池，中國人民大學公共管理學院助理教授，中國人民大學“杰出學者”青年學者。主要研究方向為公共財政與預算，公共管理與績效，公共政策評估。其研究已發(fā)表于Public Administration Review, Public Management Review, American Review of Public Administration, Public Performance and Management Review, Public Finance Review等國際公共管理和公共財政領域頂尖和權威期刊。其于2020年連續(xù)三篇論文發(fā)表于公共管理領域頂級期刊Public Administration Review。
This article examines the effect of fiscal slack on government corruption using the US states in the period from 1998 to 2012 as a research sample. Fiscal slack in the US states is commonly referred to as “rainy day funds” (RDFs), which are intended as countercyclical reserve funds for government-wide purposes. Theoretically, bureaucracy models predict that fiscal slack might catalyze the embezzlement or misuse behaviors of bureaucrats, who are considered to be budget maximizers. However, formally established and rules-bound RDFs may function as a “strongbox” that curbs officials’ discretionary power, reduces uncertainty in fiscal slack management, and ultimately restrains embezzlement and misuse behaviors. Empirically, we use the incidences and durations of natural hazards as instrumental variables for RDF balances to address the potential endogeneity problems. We find that state RDFs help reduce government corruption, especially when they are regulated by relatively looser deposit rules and stricter withdrawal rules.
