主題：精英與府際政策過程
時(shí)間：2021年4月22日（星期四）15:00-17:00
地點(diǎn)：清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院302會(huì)議室
主講人：馬嘯 北京大學(xué)政府管理學(xué)院助理教授
點(diǎn)評(píng)嘉賓：梅賜琪 清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院副教授、華宇冠名副教授、《公共管理評(píng)論》副主編兼編輯部主任
陳濟(jì)冬 清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院副教授、華宇冠名副教授
主持人：趙靜 清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院副教授，CIDEG主任助理
會(huì)議形式：現(xiàn)場(chǎng)會(huì)議
語言：中文
主辦：清華大學(xué)產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展與環(huán)境治理研究中心（CIDEG）
主講人介紹：
馬嘯，北京大學(xué)政府管理學(xué)院助理教授、博士生導(dǎo)師，華盛頓大學(xué)政治學(xué)博士。研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)楸容^政治制度、發(fā)展政治學(xué)和中國政治。當(dāng)前研究關(guān)注精英政治對(duì)政策過程、產(chǎn)權(quán)保護(hù)以及政府資源分配的影響。在Political Communication, Security Studies, China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China等國內(nèi)外期刊發(fā)表論文十余篇。主持國家自然科學(xué)基金青年科學(xué)基金、教育部人文社會(huì)科學(xué)重點(diǎn)研究基地重大項(xiàng)目子課題等研究項(xiàng)目。獲北京大學(xué)教學(xué)優(yōu)秀獎(jiǎng)、北京大學(xué)黃廷方/信和青年杰出學(xué)者等獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。
講座內(nèi)容：
How do localities secure preferential policies from central government when formal institutions of interests articulation are weak or absent? In this paper, we argue that localities can rely on the assistance of locally connected elites to secure additional policy benefits from the center. Political elites with no direct power over policy decisions can help localities through informational lobbying. We test this argument by exploring variations in the rollout of China's high-speed railway program, one of the largest infrastructure programs in human history. We find that counties that are hometowns to retired military generals who fought in wars leading to the founding of the People's Republic of China have enjoyed systematic priorities in the program. One additional living general associated with the county increases a county's chance of receiving central permission to build a high-speed railway station by as much as 44.5%. The findings are robust after accounting for a series of alternative explanations. Further analyses show that it is the moral authority associated with the generals' revolutionary credentials, instead of power vested in formal positions, that made them effective lobbyists. The paper's findings highlight the ways in which intergovernmental lobbying can shape distributive policies. (co-authored with Chengyuan Ji).
