【時 間】 2023年9月28日（周四） 15:00-17:00
【地 點】 清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院302會議室
【語 言】 中文
【主 題】 Losing target: Randomized environmental inspections and law enforcement efficiency
【主 辦】 清華大學(xué)產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展與環(huán)境治理研究中心、清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院政治與公共政策研究所
【主講人】劉夢迪 對外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)國際經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易學(xué)院副教授
【主持人】趙 靜 清華大學(xué)產(chǎn)業(yè)發(fā)展與環(huán)境治理研究中心副主任、清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院長聘副教授
【點評嘉賓】
梅賜琪 清華大學(xué)新雅書院院長、清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院長聘副教授
唐 嘯 清華大學(xué)公共管理學(xué)院副教授、國情研究院副研究員、仲英青年學(xué)者
【主講內(nèi)容介紹】
Random inspection is considered a law enforcement method that can decrease the likelihood of collusion between supervisors and supervised objects. Using over 160,000 inspection records from 2016 to 2019, this study examined how China’s implementation of randomized environmental inspections affects law enforcement efficiency. We find that randomized environmental inspections reduce the overall efficiency of law enforcement. Randomized environmental inspections revealed 11% fewer environmental problems and 5% fewer environmental violations than nonrandom inspections. Further examination of the mechanisms reveals that the implementation of randomized environmental inspections hinders the utilization of local officials' specialized knowledge in effectively targeting polluting companies and identifying violations, thereby diminishing the overall efficiency of law enforcement. However, we find that randomized environmental inspections can reduce the probability of collusion, thereby improving law enforcement efficiency. Large firms and regions with low transparency benefit more from randomized environmental inspections than small firms and regions with high transparency. To develop more effective enforcement strategies, policymakers should weigh the benefits of random inspection in reducing collusion against the drawbacks in losing target.
【主講人介紹】
劉夢迪，對外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)國際經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易學(xué)院副教授，博士生導(dǎo)師。劉夢迪博士具有經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)與環(huán)境管理交叉學(xué)科背景，長期從事環(huán)境經(jīng)濟(jì)、環(huán)境治理相關(guān)的研究，主持國家自然科學(xué)基金青年項目（72004024, 2021-2023）、面上項目（72374044, 2024-2027）。其研究成果發(fā)表于American Journal of Political Science （AJPS）、Journal of Development Economics（JDE）、Journal of Environmental Economics and Management（JEEM）、Journal of Policy Analysis and Management（JPAM）等高水平國際學(xué)術(shù)期刊。其研究成果獲得美國政治科學(xué)協(xié)會（APSA）2020年度Evan Ringquist最佳論文獎、能源經(jīng)濟(jì)與管理優(yōu)秀博士學(xué)位論文等獎項。獲得第十批惠園優(yōu)青、研究生課程評價前10%、本科生課程評價前10%、校級優(yōu)秀班主任等。
【參會方式】
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